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This paper is concerned with the apparent change in the U.S. oil price-macroeconomy 
relationship. It is investigated to what extent this change can be accounted for by the large oil 
price surges witnessed in the 1970s. The innovative approach of rolling impulse responses is 
applied and both the aggregate and the industry-level is considered. It is found that the first oil 
crisis has an “persistent” effect in the sense that this incident still dominates long-run results 
and superimposes both subsample and industry-specifics. The results, furthermore, suggest 
that the Great Moderation can essentially be explained by the non-occurrence of large oil 
shocks after the mid 1980s and that oil is less important for the economy than many 
researchers still believe. 
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March 2009 1 Introduction
An enormous amount of papers investigate the macroeconomic consequences
of oil price shocks, predominantly for the case of the U.S. economy. This
line of research has its genesis in Hamilton's (1983) seminal paper, which
emphasizes that \all but one of the U.S. recessions since World War II have
been preceded [...] by a dramatic increase in the price of crude petroleum",
and consists of empirical as well as theoretical papers.
On the empirical front the VAR modeling approach popularized by Sims
(1980) has been frequently applied [Burbidge and Harrison, 1984; Peersman
and Van Robays, 2009]. The relationship between the oil price and economic
activity, however, turned out to be more sophisticated than it originally ap-
peared to be. Bernanke et al.'s (1997, p.94) statement that \it is surprisingly
di±cult to ¯nd an indicator of oil price shocks that produces the expected
responses of macroeconomic and policy variables in a VAR setting" typi¯es
the discussion on how to correctly specify the oil price.1 Barsky and Kilian
(2004) argue that oil is less important for the economy than many researches
believe. What is more, Kilian (2008) shows that not just oil price behavior
itself, but also the underlying cause of oil price shocks changed over time.
There are also theoretical contributions that address the macroeconomics of
the oil price, see e.g. Hamilton (1988) and Rotemberg and Woodford (1995).2
This paper is motivated as follows. There is, ¯rst, evidence that the
observed impact of oil price shocks can largely be accounted for by the ¯rst
and second oil crises as well as the 1990/91 Gulf War [Gronwald, 2008].
Second, a number of empirical papers emphasize the apparent change in
1Various so-called non-linear oil price speci¯cations have been proposed in this liter-
ature. The most popular ones by Lee et al. (1995) and Hamilton (1996) promote the
view that the volatility environment in which an oil price increase takes place is crucial.
Jimenez-Rodriguez and Sanchez (2005) and Gronwald (2008) are among the most recent
papers that deal with this issue; Hamilton (2003) provides further evidence of the non-
linear character of the oil price-macro relationship. Bernanke's (1983) and Lilien's (1988)
theoretical frameworks frequently serve as motivation for these new oil price speci¯ca-
tions. Other papers such as Hooker (1996) address the issue of whether the relationship
is structurally stable.
2Jones et al. (2004) and Rogo® (2007) provide useful summaries of these research
e®orts.
2the relationship between the oil price and economic activity [Blanchard and
Gali, 2007; Edelstein and Kilian, 2007; Herrera and Pesavento, 2007]. Third,
investigating the e®ect of oil shocks on the industry-level rather than just
the aggregate level currently receives growing attention [Lee and Ni, 2002;
Herrera, 2006; Jimenez-Rodriguez, 2007].3
This paper deals, for the case of the U.S. economy, with the following
two issues: it, ¯rst, further investigates the apparent change in the oil price-
macroeconomy relationship on both the aggregate an the industry-level. The
question to what extent this change can be accounted for by the large oil price
increases discussed in Gronwald (2008) forms the core of this paper. Second,
the paper tries to shed further light on the factors explaining the Great
Moderation ¯rstly mentioned in Kim and Nelson (1999) and McConnell and
Perez-Quiros (2000).
Di®erent empirical strategies have been pursued in order to account for
this change. While Baumeister and Peersman (2008) employ an econometric
method that allows the parameters to be time-varying, various other papers
including Hooker (1996) and Herrera and Pesavento (2008) consider disjunct
subsamples. This paper, in contrast, applies the rolling impulse response
technique put forward by Blanchard and Gali (2007). They argue that \some
of the potential explanations for the change in the e®ects of oil price shocks
are more likely to have been associated with a more gradual variation over
time" (p.31); but, however, restrict themselves to bivariate rolling VARs.
This paper uses monthly industrial production data rather than quarterly
GDP data as indicator of economic activity. The larger number of observa-
tions allows the estimation of rolling impulse responses for higher dimensional
VARs, which are usually considered in the oil price literature. This innova-
tive way of using a standard approach, furthermore, facilitates comparability
of the results to those of other papers and does not involve sophisticated
structural break testing.
The following ¯ndings can be drawn from this study: ¯rst, the change in
3Bohi's (1989) industry-level study needs also to be mentioned here; which, however,
does not employ a VAR modeling approach. Kilian and Park (2008) also study industry-
level e®ects of oil price shocks, but focus on stock market returns rather than production.
3the oil price macroeconomy relationship appears to be abrupt rather than
gradual. Second, the ¯rst oil crisis 1973/74 drives main characteristics of the
full sample results and superimposes both subsample and industry-speci¯c
results. Third, there is evidence that the so-called \good luck" aspect of the
Great Moderation can be accounted for by the non-occurrence of large oil
shocks. This last ¯nding reinforces views promoted by Summers (2005) and
Nakov and Pescatori (2008).
The remainder of the paper is organized as follows: Section 2 describes
the model setup and the data, Sections 3 and 4 present the estimation results
as well as a discussion of which. Section 5, ¯nally, o®ers some concluding
remarks.
2 Empirical Setup and Data
This paper's empirical set-up is borrowed from Lee and Ni (2002). Initially, a
macro-VAR (log of total industrial production, the log of the consumer price
index, the three-month treasury bill rate, the yield for government bonds
maturing in more than 10 years, the log of M2 money supply and Hamilton's
(1996) oil price measure) is used in order to study the e®ect of oil price shocks
at the aggregate level.4 As a second step, industry-level e®ects of oil price
shocks are studied by complementing this macro-block by production data
of one out of ten two-digit and one three-digit SIC industries, also taken in
logs. Thus, one six-variable and 11 seven-variable VARs with 12 lags of the
variables in each VAR are estimated. For the macro-VARs, monthly data
from 1962:02 to 2008:11 and for the industry-level-VARs data from 1962:02
to 2002:10 is used.5 The Cholesky identi¯cation strategy is applied and
4Hamilton's (1996) oil price speci¯cation measures whether an oil price increase is larger
than decreases witnessed in the preceding 12 months. The real oil price is used, obtained
by de°ating the West Texas Intermediate Spot Price by the U.S. Producer Price Index.
5Data are drawn from the following sources: Federal Reserve (industrial production,
short-term interest rate), IMF-IFS (long-term interest rate), the U.S. Bureau of Labour
Statistics (Consumer and Producer Prices), the Conference Board (M2), and the Federal
Reserve Bank of St.Louis (oil price). Industry-level data are also drawn from the Federal
Reserve. Due to the 1997 SIC/NAICS replacement, no industry-level data-set with both
more recent data and a su±cient coverage of the 1960s/1970s is available. The data
used here is the most appropriate one for this study's focus on the particular role of the
4impulse responses are estimated in order to visualize the oil shocks e®ects,
the signi¯cance of which is assessed using asymptotic standard error bands.6
Each rolling VAR subsample consists of 200 observations; the ¯rst subsample
runs from 1962:02 to 1978:09; the last macro-one from 1992:04 to 2008:11
and the last industry-level-one from 1988:04 to 2002:10.7
Having outlined this paper's modeling approach, the industries considered
in this paper are now discussed. Among those industries are usual suspects
such as motor vehicle production and the chemical industry, but also ones
usually not considered being energy intensive such as the tobacco industry,
see Table 1. The table, furthermore, provides information regarding the
development of the industries' oil intensities from 1972 to 2002, measured
following Lee and Ni's (2002) proposal of using the cost of oil and natural gas
for each dollar of sale. It is not surprising that petroleum re¯neries and the
chemical industry have the largest portion, while e.g. the tobacco industry
is found at the bottom of the table. Taking o® at fairly low values in 1972,
the 1970s oil crises leads to a substantial increase in all industries' portions.
From the early 1990s on the ¯gures decline again. It is, furthermore, evident
that, apart from the rise of the rubber industry, there are no appreciable
changes in the order of the industries.
Lee and Ni (2002) emphasize that this measure of oil intensity is advan-
tageous to using broader energy-intensity measures as the latter do not take
into account that some energy-intensive industries have coal as the main
source of energy. Bohi (1989, 1991), however, makes use of such broader
1970s oil price increases. Furthermore, other recent studies such as Herrera (2006) and
Jimenez-Rodriguez (2007) use periods of observations that end even earlier.
6The ordering of the variables in the six-variable VAR is industrial production, con-
sumer price index, short-term interest rate, long-term interest rate, money supply and the
oil price; the industry in each seven-variable VAR is ordered after industrial production.
Thus, it is allowed for contemporaneous reactions of the oil price to the other variables.
The results, however, are robust to changes in this ordering, in particular to more exoge-
nous rankings of the oil price variable. The Appendix provides a number of alternative
speci¯cations. Using Monte Carlo standard error bands as well as bootstrap con¯dence
bands leaves the results generally unchanged. The detailed results can be obtained from
the author upon request.
7The last few industry-level subsamples, however, consist of slightly fewer observations.
They are included in order to have a su±cient amount of samples beginning after the 1986





































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































6measures and obtains a similar ranking of the industries.8
The following two sections now present this paper's empirical results,
beginning with those of the full sample in Section 3.
3 Full Sample Results
As a point of departure, the e®ect of oil price shocks on total industrial
production as well as the 11 industries is investigated using the full sample.
The results of this exercise are presented in Figure 1. The top-left panel
depicts the response of total industrial production to an oil price shock to-
gether with the analytical two-standard-error bands. Three characteristics
of the response are to be accentuated: ¯rst, there is no initial signi¯cant
response; second, 10-15 months after the shock a clear negative signi¯cant
response emerges; followed by, third, a relaxation of the e®ect. This result
is very similar to that of Lee and Ni (2002) and, furthermore, generally in
line with the literature, which ¯nds the strongest negative impact about 1
year after an oil shock's occurrence [Jimenez-Rodriguez and Sanchez, 2005;
Gronwald, 2008]. Figure 1's remaining panels report the response of the
11 industries to an oil shock, obtained from applying the strategy outlined
above. It is apparent that the response's patterns across industries are fairly
homogeneous and are, moreover, also similar to the characteristic response
of total industrial production. In particular, the negative responses' peak 10
to 15 months after the shock reappears. However, only for industries such
as paper, lumber, and rubber a signi¯cant impact is apparent - a result an-
ticipated by Section 2's discussion of the industries' oil intensities. Those
industries are ranked in upper regions of Table 1; \bottom-table" industries
such as tobacco and electronic machinery are not signi¯cantly a®ected by an
oil price shock.9
The purpose of this full sample exercise is to get a ¯rst impression of
8The same applies to using energy intensities provided by the U.S. Department of
Energy. It should be noted, however, that measuring industrial energy intensity is still
subject of discussions; see Freeman et al. (1997) and Liu and Ang (2007).
9Lee and Ni (2002) use a di®erent set of industries and ¯nd a negative signi¯cant
response for all industries but petroleum re¯neries. This is possibly due to the fact that
they use a lower signi¯cance level.
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9the relationship between the oil price and industrial production. The re-
sults are generally in line with the literature and the analysis shows that a
characteristic pattern of the results emerges at both the aggregate and the
industry-level. However, in order to make allowances to the discussion on this
relationship's change, this full sample analysis needs to be extended. The
following section's rolling impulse responses illustrate to what extent these
characteristic full sample results depend on the sample period and whether
there are di®erences regarding this across the 11 manufacturing industries.
4 Rolling Impulse Responses
Rolling impulse responses are used by Blanchard and Gali (2007) in order
to capture the change in the oil price-macroeconomy relationship in a more
gradual way. They, however, only estimate a number of bivariate VARs and
investigate relationships between the oil price and variables such as consumer
prices, GDP and employment. Blanchard and Gali (2007) argue that this
restriction to bivariate models is necessary for estimating VARs with shorter
sample periods. Their investigation of the oil price-GDP relationship shows
that the strongest responses are found for samples beginning in the 1970s.
They, however, only present point-estimates and do not discuss whether or
not signi¯cant e®ects are present.
This paper uses monthly industrial production data as indicator of eco-
nomic activity which, allows one - due to the larger number of observations
- to estimate rolling impulse responses for higher-dimensional VARs. It,
furthermore, investigates whether there are di®erences across a number of
manufacturing industries. The particular focus is on the question to what
extent the characteristic full sample results - no immediate impact, strong
signi¯cant response 10-15 month after the shock, subsequent relaxation - can
be accounted for by large oil shocks such as those associated with the ¯rst
and second oil crises. Figure 2 presents the results. The left panels contain
the responses' point estimates, the right panels the analytical upper two-
standard-error band.10 The period axis denotes the begin of the subsamples,
10This study focusses on the question whether the negative responses are signi¯cant or
10the contour plots in the ground plane are two dimensional projections of the
three dimensional impulse response surfaces. In the right panels, contours
are plotted at the zero level only. Thus, the regions within the dashed blue
lines are those areas where a signi¯cant e®ect of the oil price is found.
Inspecting the result for the total industrial production case shows im-
mediately that the responses' pattern considerably change over time. What
is more, this change appears to be fairly abrupt rather than gradual: only
for subsamples beginning prior to 1975 the characteristic full sample results
reappear. This becomes apparent from the \ditch" in the response surface
and the signi¯cance regions in the contour plots. Once the early 1970s inci-
dents are excluded from the sample, a considerably di®erent pattern emerges:
the responses appear to be weaker and to peak earlier after the shock. Only
for a few samples beginning in the late 1970s and mid 1980s a negative sig-
ni¯cant e®ect is apparent, which, furthermore, is found already about 2 to 8
months after the shock. This result the full sample results did not suggest -
this e®ect appears to be superimposed by the ¯rst oil crisis.
Getting onto the industry-level, the general tendency of the total in-
dustrial production results recurs: the change in the relationship, the \1970s
ditch", and the signi¯cance region's shifts. There are, however, some industry-
speci¯c di®erences. For industries such as motor vehicle production, chemi-
cals, paper and lumber the \1970s ditch" is even more pronounced. A coher-
ent signi¯cance region for the samples beginning prior to 1975, however, is
only found for the paper industry. The lumber industry is similarly a®ected,
but there are two separated signi¯cance regions. For the cases of the rubber
industry as well as motor vehicle production, the 1980s signi¯cance regions
appear to be more prominent - in contrast to the paper industry. The elec-
tronic machinery industry, ¯nally, is only signi¯cantly a®ected in the very
early, the furniture industry only in the more recent subsamples. These re-
sults the homogeneous full sample results did not suggest either and, thus,
there are also industry-speci¯cs that are superimposed by the ¯rst oil crisis.
In accordance with the full sample results, however, the tobacco industry
remains essentially una®ected.
not. Therefore, the lower error bands are not of interest.
11Figure 2: Rolling Impulse Responses
Total Industrial Production
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15In a nutshell, the rolling impulse response technique employed here lends
itself as to be used as it facilitates comparability of the results to those of
other papers, allows for capturing also gradual changes and does not involve
sophisticated structural break testing. The empirical result's contribution
to the existing literature is twofold: they shed further light on, ¯rst, the
discussion on the change in the oil price-macroeconomy nexus, and, second,
on the factors explaining the Great Moderation.
Regarding the ¯rst, the ¯nding of a considerable change in the relation-
ship between the oil price and macroeconomic activity is con¯rmed. This
change, however, appears to be abrupt rather than gradual. There are suf-
¯cient grounds for concluding that the 1970s oil shocks and the subsequent
economic downturns still have a dominant impact on the results of standard
empirical analyses. It has been shown that this study's full sample results
- which are very similar to those of other recent studies - are largely at-
tributable to the ¯rst oil crisis. The application of rolling impulse responses
shows that once this incident is excluded from the sample, the pattern of the
responses considerably changes. Moreover, some speci¯c results of periods
beginning around the mid 1980s could not have been anticipated from the
full sample results - they are superimposed by the ¯rst oil crisis. Thus, in
this sense this incident has \persistent" e®ects. Assuming that the strongest
response of macroeconomic activity occurs about 1 year after the oil shocks,
additionally, is fallacious and possibly leads to inappropriate policy measures.
What is more, also important industry-speci¯cs are superimposed by the ¯rst
oil crisis. There are, however, a number of recent papers - Jimenez-Rodriguez
and Sanchez (2005), Herrera (2006) and Huntington (2007) to name just a
few - who certainly have novelty values such as the consideration of invento-
ries, real income and more thorough cross-country comparisons, but employ
standard empirical approaches that do not adequately account for the change
in the oil price-macroeconomy nexus. Thus, it is not unlikely, that their re-
sults are also dominated by the 1970s and do not re°ect the relationship in
its current shape. In consequence, the empirical set-ups of these studies must
be rethought.
Regarding the second, the Great Moderation, ¯rstly discussed by Kim
16and Nelson (1999) and McConnell and Perez-Quiros (2000), ¯nds three tra-
ditional explanations: ¯rst, improvements in inventory holding techniques
[McConnell and Perez-Quiros, 2000], second, a better monetary policy [Clar-
ida et al., 2000] and, third, \good luck" in the sense of the non-occurrence
of adverse shocks to the economy [Stock and Watson, 2002]. Regarding
the latter, recent papers such as Summers (2005) and Nakov and Pesca-
tori (2008) argue that this \good luck" aspect can be accounted for by the
non-occurrence of large oil shocks after the mid 1980s. This paper's results
reinforce this argument. The rolling impulse responses show that the last
subsamples with a signi¯cant impact of the oil price on industrial production
begin around the mid 1980s. What is more, neither on the aggregate nor on
the industry-level a signi¯cant e®ect is found for the most recent subsamples.
Two additional notions exist in the literature that need to be discussed
now. First, Bernanke et al. (1997) promote the view that important e®ects of
oil price shocks are attributable to bad monetary policy measures in response
to an oil shock rather than the shock itself. Second, Kilian (2008) decomposes
oil prices in oil supply shocks, aggregate demand shocks, and oil-market
speci¯c demand shocks and shows that these three shocks have considerably
di®erent impacts on real economic activity. The ¯nding that the oil price
surge witnessed after 2003 is driven by aggregate demand helps to explain
why this surge did not cause a recession in the United States. In the same
vein, Barsky and Kilian (2004) challenge a number of traditional notions and
conclude that \disturbances in the oil market are likely to matter less for U.S.
macroeconomic performance than has commonly been thought." It might be
that there is an interaction between the size of the oil shocks focussed in
this paper on the one hand and the shock's underlying cause and the role
of monetary policy on the other. The abruptness of the change found in
this study, however, suggests that the large oil price shocks are the culprit.11
The key ¯ndings of this paper, ultimately, remain una®ected even if there is
a strong interaction: the ¯rst oil crisis still has a dominant impact on the
long-run empirical results and the Great Moderation can still be accounted
11Moreover, Kilian's (2008) data start in 1975. Hence, the ¯rst oil crisis this paper
focusses on is not included in his sample.
17for by the non-occurrence of large oil price shocks after the mid 1980s. In
a way, these ¯ndings tally with those of Barsky and Kilian (2004): the oil
price appears to have a considerably smaller impact than a number of recent
papers still suggest.12
5 Conclusions
There is no doubt about the fact that the 1970s oil crises had a lasting e®ect
on the economy. The increases' magnitude itself is still hard to match and,
what is more, they took everybody completely unawares: the economy was
marked by a fairly high share of oil, monetary authorities were forced to
act ad-hoc, and ¯rms and households needed to adjust their behavior in a
considerably uncertain environment.
This, naturally, was a sublime concern for theoretical as well as empir-
ical economists to investigate these dramatic incidents - Hamilton's (1983)
seminal paper is considered a landmark in this literature. This and a larger
number of subsequent empirical papers employ standard VAR models in or-
der to capture this relationship. The fact that the relationship is not stable
and easy to model, expressed by discussions regarding the functional form
[Hamilton, 2003] and the proposal of various non-linear oil price measures
[Hamilton, 1996; Lee and Ni, 1995], however, indicates that this task has
proven to be more complicated than it originally appeared to be.
Recent evidence suggests, ¯rst, that the observed impact of oil price
shocks is largely attributable to no fewer than three large oil price shocks
- those associated to the ¯rst oil crisis 1973/74, the second oil crisis 1978/79
and the Gulf War 1990/91 [Gronwald, 2008]. Second, it is apparent that the
relationship between the oil price and the macroeconomy has undergone a
considerable change in the past few decades [Blanchard and Gali, 2007; Edel-
stein and Kilian, 2007]. Third, a newly established line of research considers
the e®ects of oil price shocks also on the industry-level [Lee and Ni, 2002;
Kilian and Park, 2008].
This paper contributes to the existing literature in two ways. It, ¯rst,
12See, for instance, Peersman and Van Robays (2009).
18reconsiders the change in the relationship between the oil price and macroe-
conomic activity by focussing on the large oil price surges mentioned above.
Second, it tries to shed further light on the explanations of the so-called
Great Moderation. It employs the innovative technique of rolling impulse
responses in order to illustrate this change. Monthly industrial production
data rather than quarterly GDP data as indicator of economic activity is
used. This allows one - due to the larger number of observations - to esti-
mate rolling impulse responses for higher-dimensional VARs. What is more,
this approach facilitates comparability of the results to those of other papers
and does not involve structural break testing.
The following key results emerge from this paper: ¯rst, the apparent
change in the oil price-macroeconomy relationship appears to be abrupt
rather than gradual and, what is more, is largely attributable to the ¯rst
oil crisis. This incident still has a dominant impact on studies using fre-
quently considered samples running from the 1960s to present - in particular
the ¯nding of the strongest response of economic activity one year after the
oil shock's occurrence. Once this incident is removed from the sample, the
pattern of the results considerably changes - in this sense the ¯rst oil crisis
has \persistent" e®ects. The consideration of the industry-level, furthermore,
shows that there are substantial di®erences across manufacturing industries.
While industries such as paper are only signi¯cantly a®ected in early sub-
samples, motor vehicle production and the rubber industry show clearly dif-
ferent responses to oil price shocks and are only signi¯cantly a®ected in later
subsamples. In a nutshell, both subsample and industry-speci¯c results are
superimposed.
Second, there is strong evidence that the \good luck" aspect of the Great
Moderation can be accounted for by the non-occurrence of large oil shocks
after the mid 1980s. The last subsamples where an signi¯cant e®ect of the oil
price on industrial production is found begin around the mid 1980s. Thus,
this paper reinforces views expressed by Summers (2005) and Nakov and
Pescatori (2008). Fortune, however, is known to be ¯ckle, which implies
that relying on a forever-stable economy could be hazardous. The current
¯nancial crisis is a possible herald of an end of the Great Moderation.
19Thus, large oil price shocks can be regarded as very powerful in two
ways. Their occurrence can cause severe economic crises and can a®ect results
of empirical studies in surprisingly strong manner. Their non-occurrence,
however, is able to move the economy to a regime of remarkable tranquility.
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